“…tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam” (Matt. 16:18). With these words, Our Lord Jesus Christ established St. Peter as the visible head of the Catholic Church on earth, His very own vicar, and the center of unity in ecclesiastical governance. It is thus of supreme importance to ensure that when the election of the Roman Pontiff takes place, the faithful should not be left with doubts regarding the validity of the election. Nevertheless, the Cardinals of the Church are as human as everyone else, and when it comes to the application of canon law, it is inevitable that sometimes they will make mistakes or even commit flagrant violations of the law. Thus, it is of paramount importance that Catholics understand what does and does not lead to the invalid election of the Roman Pontiff.
Many have attempted to dismiss my conclusions based on the fact that the examples I provide in the section "Canonical Equity and Reasonableness" are ridiculous. Not only is this argument a cop-out, it actually proves my point: the examples are SUPPOSED to be ridiculous to demonstrate why an overly broad interpretation of UDG 76 would lead to unreasonable results, and because it leads to unreasonable results, it cannot be correct because law is an ordinance of reason.
Surely no sane person would believe that a spelling mistake or a natural disaster would invalidate a papal election. But it IS the absurd conclusion that would logically follow from an interpretation that holds that UDG 76 applies to any violation of any provision within the entire document. People need to have the intellectual honesty to actually OWN the consequences of their own position or humbly accept that they were wrong if they cannot.
It is unfortunate that you never addressed the specific issue at hand which makes the whole question of UDG 76 relevant. It is the fact that UDG 33 states quite clearly that the number of electors in the Conclave MUST NOT exceed 120. Yet 133 men voted in the May 7-8, 2025 Conclave. Which is a clear, flagrant, willful, and explicit violation of the law that radically alters the composition of the electorate.
But you didn't answer that question. Instead you addressed fictitious cases like natural disasters, and misspelled names, and burnt ballots, which did not happen, while not addressing the real case of what actually did happen. In any case I would presume from your basic argument that you would not accept that as invalidating the election so we have to then move on to the other issue here.
As previously stated No. 33 of UDG permits there to be only 120 Cardinal electors but we ended up having 133 Cardinals remaining in the Sistine Chapel throughout the entire process. No. 52 and No. 54 make it clear that everyone except the Cardinal electors must leave the Sistine Chapel before the election may begin. No. 33 limits the number of electors to 120, yet there were 133 men in the room. Thirteen men who were required to leave the chapel before the voting could even start did not leave.
Ergo the voting never started. Ergo there was no vote. The dog and pony show they went through afterward was just as legitimate as if myself and 132 of my best friends got together, held a vote, and declared the winner to be the Roman Pontiff. It was a moment of unreality that needs to be corrected forthwith.
Because 13 men who were not permitted to be in the Sistine Chapel during the election did not leave the election never started and therefore whatever was done afterwards has absolutely no relevance to the question of who the Roman Pontiff is. Legally speaking they never voted so the sede vacante never ended. Either way the 133 kills you.
I completely get that after a decade of baseless theories about Benevacantism put out by charlatans on the internet people don't want to hear this. So fine do your thing. We Catholics have become experts at ignoring reality and our media and our 'experts' have assisted us mightily in this task. But the bill for what they did here, along with everything else that we have stuck our heads in the sand about, will have to be paid at some point.
1. With regard to the argument that there was no vote, I refer you back to canon 10. Unless the law explicitly states that the continued presence of non-electors actually invalidates the vote (i.e. leads to no vote having occurred), it does not.
2. Your rejection of my hypotheticals is a cop-out. Obviously I don't believe that a spelling error invalidates a papal election. But the conclusion that it does proceeds from YOUR interpretation (that any violation of any part of UDG causes invalidity), not mine. You need to OWN the consequences of your own interpretation. And if your interpretation leads to what we both recognize as an unreasonable conclusion, then your interpretation is simply wrong.
3. As already addressed in the article, canon 15 states that whether legal violations occur due to good faith, ignorance, malice, or any other motive has ABSOLUTELY NO impact on whether those laws are invalidating. Your repeated emphasis on the "flagrant, willful, and explicit violation of the law" is devoid of any legal merit and is empty rhetoric meant to stir up outrage and incite others to suspend judgment and unquestioningly accept your position lest they "defend lawbreakers."
4. I didn't write the article you wanted me to write, and your response here indicates exactly why. Addressing a specific scandal right off the bat will bring out preconceived opinions and emotions which, as your comment demonstrates, precludes the chance at having an objective, dispassionate conversation. You're free to be disappointed that I chose objectivity and the bigger picture over throwing more gasoline on the dumpster fire of the day, but that is ultimately not my problem.
I also do not have the time to address every single new argument about why Leo XIV's election was allegedly invalid. So I chose to cut to the chase and establish the objective principles first, and I believe my readers have the intelligence to engage in deductive reasoning themselves.
Your approach to UDG 76 is rather common, but erroneous, because you are attempting to interpret the law, which you do not have any right to do. UDG 76 says in any other way. Since UDG 76 is removed from the authority of even the Cardinals to interpret (UDG 5), then certainly it is removed from the realm of laws which canonists can interpret. In fact, being a specific and not a general law, you cannot apply the rules of for the interpretation of general laws, rather, you must read it as it is and explains itself. Since any doubt in the validity of the election of a Roman Pontiff would lead to a doubtful jurisdiction, the conferral of the office must be impeccable and without error. You arguments from spelling errors or force majeur are simply sophistic tricks used to create a precedence for obviating UDG 76. UDG 76 is clear it requires that all the prescriptions of the entire constitution as well as those regarding the act of the election, must be observed. And any failure results in invalidity, an invalidity which is not the end of the world, but can be easily cured by the Cardinals returning in Conclave and redoing the election.
Alexis — Thank you for commenting. I'll try to keep this as brief and organized as possible.
1. I wasn’t aware that my approach was “rather common” since I have not found a single published scholarly source making the same argument as I did in this article. Would you be so kind as to point me to those sources?
2. Private individuals are permitted to interpret canon law, and this is called doctrinal interpretation. However, they cannot authentically interpret canon law unless such a task has been entrusted to them by the legislator (c. 16). Think of it the same way we treat opinions in theology: you may favor one or disagree with another, but some opinions are well-founded, more or less probable, or merely tolerated, depending on the arguments for or against these opinions and the scholarly credentials of the persons holding them. Without theological opinions or doctrinal interpretation of law, the entire fields of theology and canon law become pointless and nonsensical. My subtitle makes it clear that what I am doing is doctrinal interpretation, and I also call upon the legislator in the last paragraph to issue an authentic interpretation, so the distinction should be clear.
3. Your claim about UDG 5 is not only incorrect but actually the exact opposite of what it states, which is that the College of Cardinals possesses the right of definitive interpretation during the Conclave. Nor does it deny canonists and other scholars the right to have an opinion; however, those opinions are not definitive (refer back to #2 above).
4. The rules of interpretation I cited within the article (including canons 6, 10, 15, 17, 18, and 21) do not restrict their application to general laws and exclude specific laws. On the contrary, canon 17 requires us to examine the purpose and circumstances of the law in question; circumstances are necessarily specific things, and so canon 17 CAN apply to specific laws. Canon 18 even lists entire categories of laws, including laws that restrict the free exercise of rights, penal laws, and exceptions. Rights may be given to many people for many cases or specific persons for specific cases (e.g. the laws surrounding delegation and subdelegation), and the same likewise applies to restricting these same rights. Exceptions are almost always given to deal with specific cases foreseen by the legislator. I could go on but you get the point.
5. I foresaw while writing the article that someone would object to my examples of spelling errors and unforeseen circumstances to discredit my position, and so that objection was already answered in the article itself:
“‘But,’ one may object, ‘these examples concern mistakes made in good faith and circumstances that were genuinely outside of human control. Surely intentional disobedience on the part of the Cardinal electors would lead to far greater canonical consequences!’ While such disobedience could lead to canonical consequences for the individual(s) who broke the law depending on whether such disobedience constituted a canonical delict, the subjective intention of the perpetrators has absolutely no impact on the application of invalidating and disqualifying laws: ‘If [such laws] were to become ineffectual due to ignorance or error, […] there would never be certainty that juridic acts were valid.’ If something is invalid, it is invalid, regardless of whether the act that rendered it invalid was committed through malice, ignorance, or error, a fact that canon 15 states explicitly.”
Now your argument—that UDG 76 applies to “all the prescriptions of the entire constitution as well as those regarding the act of the election”—is in line with what this paragraph responds to. There are a thousand ways in which an election could take place in “any other way” than what the Apostolic Constitution prescribes, including spelling errors and events outside of the Cardinals’ control. Invalidating laws do not cease to be invalidating laws solely due to the gravity or lack thereof of the violation or the subjective intent of the violator. So if your position is that any violation of any part of UDG leads to an invalid election, then you need to OWN your words and recognize that your own interpretation leads to spelling errors and “force majeure” also invalidating an election. You do not get to make an exception for these things simply because you feel like it.
The true irony here is that you attempt to deny my right to private interpretation while engaging in precisely the same activity yourself. If you argue that UDG 76 means that any violation of any provision of the Apostolic Constitution leads to an invalid election, you are already presenting a canonical interpretation. You have already taken on a presumed canonical definition of “any other way.” This is doubly so if you are now going to arbitrarily exclude certain valid examples of legal violations for the sole reason that they cast doubt upon your personal reading of UDG 76. So if we’re both going to engage in interpretation here, we might as well get to the heart of the issue, which is whose interpretation is more well-founded upon on established principles of jurisprudence.
It seems to me that question has already been answered, given that you yourself seem to recognize that your interpretation—when not subjected to arbitrary and illogical exceptions—would lead to unreasonable conclusions that would destroy the very notion of law as an ordinance of reason. And if other scholars have made the same "rather common" argument as I have made here, then it becomes even more clear which opinion is more probable.
Many have attempted to dismiss my conclusions based on the fact that the examples I provide in the section "Canonical Equity and Reasonableness" are ridiculous. Not only is this argument a cop-out, it actually proves my point: the examples are SUPPOSED to be ridiculous to demonstrate why an overly broad interpretation of UDG 76 would lead to unreasonable results, and because it leads to unreasonable results, it cannot be correct because law is an ordinance of reason.
Surely no sane person would believe that a spelling mistake or a natural disaster would invalidate a papal election. But it IS the absurd conclusion that would logically follow from an interpretation that holds that UDG 76 applies to any violation of any provision within the entire document. People need to have the intellectual honesty to actually OWN the consequences of their own position or humbly accept that they were wrong if they cannot.
It is unfortunate that you never addressed the specific issue at hand which makes the whole question of UDG 76 relevant. It is the fact that UDG 33 states quite clearly that the number of electors in the Conclave MUST NOT exceed 120. Yet 133 men voted in the May 7-8, 2025 Conclave. Which is a clear, flagrant, willful, and explicit violation of the law that radically alters the composition of the electorate.
But you didn't answer that question. Instead you addressed fictitious cases like natural disasters, and misspelled names, and burnt ballots, which did not happen, while not addressing the real case of what actually did happen. In any case I would presume from your basic argument that you would not accept that as invalidating the election so we have to then move on to the other issue here.
As previously stated No. 33 of UDG permits there to be only 120 Cardinal electors but we ended up having 133 Cardinals remaining in the Sistine Chapel throughout the entire process. No. 52 and No. 54 make it clear that everyone except the Cardinal electors must leave the Sistine Chapel before the election may begin. No. 33 limits the number of electors to 120, yet there were 133 men in the room. Thirteen men who were required to leave the chapel before the voting could even start did not leave.
Ergo the voting never started. Ergo there was no vote. The dog and pony show they went through afterward was just as legitimate as if myself and 132 of my best friends got together, held a vote, and declared the winner to be the Roman Pontiff. It was a moment of unreality that needs to be corrected forthwith.
Because 13 men who were not permitted to be in the Sistine Chapel during the election did not leave the election never started and therefore whatever was done afterwards has absolutely no relevance to the question of who the Roman Pontiff is. Legally speaking they never voted so the sede vacante never ended. Either way the 133 kills you.
I completely get that after a decade of baseless theories about Benevacantism put out by charlatans on the internet people don't want to hear this. So fine do your thing. We Catholics have become experts at ignoring reality and our media and our 'experts' have assisted us mightily in this task. But the bill for what they did here, along with everything else that we have stuck our heads in the sand about, will have to be paid at some point.
Eric —
1. With regard to the argument that there was no vote, I refer you back to canon 10. Unless the law explicitly states that the continued presence of non-electors actually invalidates the vote (i.e. leads to no vote having occurred), it does not.
2. Your rejection of my hypotheticals is a cop-out. Obviously I don't believe that a spelling error invalidates a papal election. But the conclusion that it does proceeds from YOUR interpretation (that any violation of any part of UDG causes invalidity), not mine. You need to OWN the consequences of your own interpretation. And if your interpretation leads to what we both recognize as an unreasonable conclusion, then your interpretation is simply wrong.
3. As already addressed in the article, canon 15 states that whether legal violations occur due to good faith, ignorance, malice, or any other motive has ABSOLUTELY NO impact on whether those laws are invalidating. Your repeated emphasis on the "flagrant, willful, and explicit violation of the law" is devoid of any legal merit and is empty rhetoric meant to stir up outrage and incite others to suspend judgment and unquestioningly accept your position lest they "defend lawbreakers."
4. I didn't write the article you wanted me to write, and your response here indicates exactly why. Addressing a specific scandal right off the bat will bring out preconceived opinions and emotions which, as your comment demonstrates, precludes the chance at having an objective, dispassionate conversation. You're free to be disappointed that I chose objectivity and the bigger picture over throwing more gasoline on the dumpster fire of the day, but that is ultimately not my problem.
I also do not have the time to address every single new argument about why Leo XIV's election was allegedly invalid. So I chose to cut to the chase and establish the objective principles first, and I believe my readers have the intelligence to engage in deductive reasoning themselves.
Your approach to UDG 76 is rather common, but erroneous, because you are attempting to interpret the law, which you do not have any right to do. UDG 76 says in any other way. Since UDG 76 is removed from the authority of even the Cardinals to interpret (UDG 5), then certainly it is removed from the realm of laws which canonists can interpret. In fact, being a specific and not a general law, you cannot apply the rules of for the interpretation of general laws, rather, you must read it as it is and explains itself. Since any doubt in the validity of the election of a Roman Pontiff would lead to a doubtful jurisdiction, the conferral of the office must be impeccable and without error. You arguments from spelling errors or force majeur are simply sophistic tricks used to create a precedence for obviating UDG 76. UDG 76 is clear it requires that all the prescriptions of the entire constitution as well as those regarding the act of the election, must be observed. And any failure results in invalidity, an invalidity which is not the end of the world, but can be easily cured by the Cardinals returning in Conclave and redoing the election.
Alexis — Thank you for commenting. I'll try to keep this as brief and organized as possible.
1. I wasn’t aware that my approach was “rather common” since I have not found a single published scholarly source making the same argument as I did in this article. Would you be so kind as to point me to those sources?
2. Private individuals are permitted to interpret canon law, and this is called doctrinal interpretation. However, they cannot authentically interpret canon law unless such a task has been entrusted to them by the legislator (c. 16). Think of it the same way we treat opinions in theology: you may favor one or disagree with another, but some opinions are well-founded, more or less probable, or merely tolerated, depending on the arguments for or against these opinions and the scholarly credentials of the persons holding them. Without theological opinions or doctrinal interpretation of law, the entire fields of theology and canon law become pointless and nonsensical. My subtitle makes it clear that what I am doing is doctrinal interpretation, and I also call upon the legislator in the last paragraph to issue an authentic interpretation, so the distinction should be clear.
3. Your claim about UDG 5 is not only incorrect but actually the exact opposite of what it states, which is that the College of Cardinals possesses the right of definitive interpretation during the Conclave. Nor does it deny canonists and other scholars the right to have an opinion; however, those opinions are not definitive (refer back to #2 above).
4. The rules of interpretation I cited within the article (including canons 6, 10, 15, 17, 18, and 21) do not restrict their application to general laws and exclude specific laws. On the contrary, canon 17 requires us to examine the purpose and circumstances of the law in question; circumstances are necessarily specific things, and so canon 17 CAN apply to specific laws. Canon 18 even lists entire categories of laws, including laws that restrict the free exercise of rights, penal laws, and exceptions. Rights may be given to many people for many cases or specific persons for specific cases (e.g. the laws surrounding delegation and subdelegation), and the same likewise applies to restricting these same rights. Exceptions are almost always given to deal with specific cases foreseen by the legislator. I could go on but you get the point.
5. I foresaw while writing the article that someone would object to my examples of spelling errors and unforeseen circumstances to discredit my position, and so that objection was already answered in the article itself:
“‘But,’ one may object, ‘these examples concern mistakes made in good faith and circumstances that were genuinely outside of human control. Surely intentional disobedience on the part of the Cardinal electors would lead to far greater canonical consequences!’ While such disobedience could lead to canonical consequences for the individual(s) who broke the law depending on whether such disobedience constituted a canonical delict, the subjective intention of the perpetrators has absolutely no impact on the application of invalidating and disqualifying laws: ‘If [such laws] were to become ineffectual due to ignorance or error, […] there would never be certainty that juridic acts were valid.’ If something is invalid, it is invalid, regardless of whether the act that rendered it invalid was committed through malice, ignorance, or error, a fact that canon 15 states explicitly.”
Now your argument—that UDG 76 applies to “all the prescriptions of the entire constitution as well as those regarding the act of the election”—is in line with what this paragraph responds to. There are a thousand ways in which an election could take place in “any other way” than what the Apostolic Constitution prescribes, including spelling errors and events outside of the Cardinals’ control. Invalidating laws do not cease to be invalidating laws solely due to the gravity or lack thereof of the violation or the subjective intent of the violator. So if your position is that any violation of any part of UDG leads to an invalid election, then you need to OWN your words and recognize that your own interpretation leads to spelling errors and “force majeure” also invalidating an election. You do not get to make an exception for these things simply because you feel like it.
The true irony here is that you attempt to deny my right to private interpretation while engaging in precisely the same activity yourself. If you argue that UDG 76 means that any violation of any provision of the Apostolic Constitution leads to an invalid election, you are already presenting a canonical interpretation. You have already taken on a presumed canonical definition of “any other way.” This is doubly so if you are now going to arbitrarily exclude certain valid examples of legal violations for the sole reason that they cast doubt upon your personal reading of UDG 76. So if we’re both going to engage in interpretation here, we might as well get to the heart of the issue, which is whose interpretation is more well-founded upon on established principles of jurisprudence.
It seems to me that question has already been answered, given that you yourself seem to recognize that your interpretation—when not subjected to arbitrary and illogical exceptions—would lead to unreasonable conclusions that would destroy the very notion of law as an ordinance of reason. And if other scholars have made the same "rather common" argument as I have made here, then it becomes even more clear which opinion is more probable.